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ENMUND V. FLORIDA: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON A CO-FELON
IN FELONY MURDER
For over one hundred years, the United States Supreme Court has struggled
to define cruel and unusual punishment and to determine what specific
punishments are prohibited by the eighth amendment.' Although current stan-
dards for cruel and unusual punishment are easily articulated, they are dif-
ficult to apply.2 Moreover, these standards fail to resolve the problem fully.
The philosophy underlying the eighth amendment's prohibitions has pro-
gressed from the view that cruel and unusual punishment means something
more than the mere extinguishment of life,3 to the conclusion that while
execution may be a constitutionally permissible penalty for deliberate murder 4
it is an unconstitutional sanction for rape because the victim's life was not
1. As early as 1878, the Court recognized the difficulty in defining the meaning of cruel
and unusual punishment. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878); see also Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 276-77 n.20 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that the cruel
and unusual punishment clause is impossible to define precisely); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 99 (1958) (the exact scope of cruel and unusual punishment has not been detailed). One
commentator explains this difficulty by observing that because the factual situations are so
diverse, it is impossible to arrive at one legal definition which can apply to all situations. Con-
sequently, the Court has adopted a definition which permits wide latitude in interpretation,
and as a result, its definition of the cruel and unusual punishment clause is difficult to apply
and its applications often are inconsistent. Note, Capital Punishment: A Review of Recent
Supreme Court Decisions, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 261, 263 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Recent Supreme Court Decisions]. For a detailed history of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause, see THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (H. Bedau ed. 1964); M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973).
2. See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text; see also Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declar-
ing The Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1773 (1970). In that article, the
authors declare that the "cruel and unusual punishment doctrine is not well developed. The
Court has not consistently and explicitly applied any one test under the clause." Id. at 1777.
3. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890). Kemmler was convicted of first-degree murder
and sentenced to die by means of electrocution, Id. at 441. Basing his writ of habeas corpus
on constitutional grounds, Kemmler argued that the death penalty deprived him of liberty,
and threatened to deprive him of life, without due process of law. Id. at 438-39. The Court
addressed the issue of whether the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment. In con-
cluding that the death penalty was not unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that the death
penalty had a long history of acceptance and that execution was not considered to be torture.
Id. at 446-47.
It should be noted that in the early history of the Court's interpretation of the eighth amend-
ment, the Court did not attempt to define cruel and unusual punishment exhaustively in the
context of existing societal views. Rather, the Court merely examined what was considered
cruel and unusual punishment at the time the Bill of Rights was framed. Justice Brennan recog-
nized this fact in Furman v. Georgia as he canvassed the history of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 264 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
4. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976); see also infra notes 33-36 and accompany-
ing text.
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taken.' Until Enmund v. Florida was decided, 6 it remained uncertain whether
the death penalty was a constitutional punishment for crimes involving a
killing that was not deliberate.7
In Enmund, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the death
penalty is a constitutionally permissible punishment for a co-felon who neither
caused the victim's death nor intended the death to occur. The evidence in-
troduced in that case showed that Earl Enmund and two accomplices plan-
ned the robbery of the Kersey farm. Their plan went awry, however, and
while Enmund waited in the getaway car, his two accomplices killed the
Kerseys. 8 Although Enmund neither killed anyone nor intended for anyone
to be killed, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that his participation in
a felony out of which a murder arose was sufficient to warrant the death
penalty.9 Yet, the United States Supreme Court rejected this conclusion. Ap-
plying the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause, the
Supreme Court reversed the Florida court and held that the death penalty
could not be imposed upon a co-felon who neither killed nor intended that
a killing occur."
The Enmund holding effectively limits the use of the felony-murder
doctrine' because transferred intent, which is at the heart of the felony-
murder concept, no longer will be sufficient to warrant capital punishment.' 2
Moreover, previous Court decisions established standards to be applied in
determining the circumstances under which capital punishment is cruel and
unusual.' 3 Although the Enmund Court purportedly relied on these stan-
dards, its analysis was tenuous and inconclusive. Finally, because it appears
to adopt a new eighth amendment requirement of proving specific intent,
the Enmund decision will affect those standards; however, this new require-
ment may prove difficult to apply."
5. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); see also infra notes 46-53 and accompany-
ing text.
6. 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
7. Other issues remain unanswered even after Enmund. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 609 n.16 (1978) (whether the Constitution requires that the death penalty be imposed
by a jury); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 n.5 (1977) (whether the death penalty
may be automatically inflicted upon any person who commits a murder while already serving
a life sentence).
8. 102 S. Ct. at 3370.
9. Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1371 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam).
10. 102 S. Ct. at 3376-77.
11. See infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
12. It should be noted that the Enmund decision only prohibits transferred intent among
co-felons when the punishment is death. Transferred intent continues to support a less severe
sanction, such as life imprisonment. See infra note 125.
13. For a discussion of the standards for cruel and unusual punishment, see infra notes
16-20 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND
The Prohibition of Cruel and Unusual Punishment and the Death Penalty
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part,
that "cruel and unusual punishment [shall not be] inflicted."'" Today, the
eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment en-
compasses four main, independent principles: (1) the punishment must not
be inherently cruel;' 6 (2) the punishment must not be disproportionate to
the crime;' 7 (3) the punishment must not affront human dignity;'8 and (4)
the punishment must be acceptable to society.' 9 Because the cruel and unusual
punishment prohibition is not a static provision, these principles are defined
according to "evolving standards of decency." 20
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment also provides that "[excessive bail
shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." Id.
16. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878). In Wilkerson, the method of execution,
shooting, was challenged as being unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 131.
Although the Wilkerson Court established the first concrete principle of cruel and unusual punish-
ment, it nevertheless held that execution by shooting was not unnecessary cruelty. Id. at 135-36.
This holding is not surprising considering the Court's examples of what it found to constitute
inherent cruelty: embowelling while alive, public dissection, and burning at the stake. Id. at 135.
17. The issue of proportionality first was adopted by the Court in Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349 (1910). In that case, a Philippine official who was found guilty of falsifying a
government document was sentenced to 15 years of hard and painful labor. Furthermore, he
was permanently denied his parental, property, and voting rights, and upon his release from
prison, he was to be under lifetime surveillance. Id. at 351, 357. The Court found this punish-
ment violative of the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and,
therefore, held that the eighth amendment prohibits punishments which arc! excessive or dispor-
portionate to the crime. Id. at 380-81. See generally Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Propor-
tionality Analysis and the Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
378 (1980) (explanation of historical and recent application of the eighth amendment propor-
tionality requirement).
18. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). The petitioner in that case was court-martialed
for desertion and sentenced to three years hard labor, forfeiture of pay, and a dishonorable
discharge. Id. at 88. Moreover, under § 401(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940, the petitioner
lost his nationality and all rights of United States citizenship because of the dishonorable discharge
resulting from his desertion. Id. at 88-90. Based on the belief that the eighth amendment pro-
tects human dignity, the Supreme Court held that this punishment was unconstitutional because
the state had exceeded the bounds of civilized standards. Id. at 100.
Agreeing with the appellate court's concept of human dignity, the Trop Court quoted the
following passage from the lower court's opinion: "The American concept of man's dignity
does not comport with making even those we would punish completely 'stateless'-fair game
for the despoiler at home and the oppressor abroad, if indeed there is any place which will
tolerate them at all." Id. at 101 n.33 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 239 F.2d 527, 530 (2d Cir.
1956)). Yet, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter declared that denationalization was
not punishment. Id. at 124-26 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Frankfurter observed
that even if it were punishment, it was not cruel and unusual because the statute authorized
death as a possible punishment, and denationalization was less severe than death. Id.
19. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
20. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
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The Supreme Court first articulated the premise that cruel and unusual
punishment was a flexible concept which should reflect society's changing
values, in Weems v. United States.2 In Trop v. Dulles,22 the Court rein-
forced the evolving standards of decency idea as essential to determining
the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment.3 Trop also articulated ob-
jective criteria for determining this standard of decency. The Court indicated
that indicia of the standard were the history of the particular punishment
and contemporary acceptance of that punishment.2"
Those advocating abolition of the death penalty employed this evolving
standards of decency principle to argue that, because it was no longer' ac-
cepted by society, the death penalty was unconstitutional. 5 Finding this lack
of societal acceptance in the fact that the death penalty infrequently was
imposed as a punishment, some commentators maintained that the Supreme
Court should hold the death penalty unconstitutional. 6 In the 1972 decision
of Furman v. Georgia,27 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide
whether the death penalty violated the eighth amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. The Court, however, did not rule on the
constitutionality of the death penalty per se; rather, the Furman Court's
holding was limited to the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied
in that particular case. 8
Although complicated by the existence of nine separate and confusing
opinions," the Furman decision essentially declared that statutes which allow
21. 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). The Supreme Court stated that the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by humane justice." Id. For the facts of Weems, see supra note 17.
22. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). For the facts of Trop, see supra note 18.
23. The importance of the evolving standards of decency notion is that it "mark[s] the
progress of a maturing society." 356 U.S. at 101. The Trop Court recognized that Weema,
v. United States was the first case to hold that the scope of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause is not static. Id. at 100-01.
24. Id. at 99-100. The Trop Court compared the death penalty with the severe punishment
of losing citizenship rights under the Nationality Act of 1940 and recognized that, although
the death penalty has been a historically accepted means of punishment, civilized society has
long abhorred the loss of nationality as a punishment. Id. at 99-101.
25. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 297-300 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(one of the reasons the death penalty is unconstitutional is that contemporary society rejects
death as an appropriate punishment).
26. See, e.g., Note, Recent Supreme Court Decisions, supra note 1, at 268.
27. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). Furman was the consolidation of three death penalty
cases: Furman v. Georgia (conviction for murder); Jackson v. Georgia (conviction for rape);
and Branch v. Texas (conviction for rape). Id. at 239.
28. Id. at 239-40.
29. The holding in Furman initially appears simple, but an examination of the nine separate
opinions which were filed in that case illustrates the confusing nature of the Court's decision.
Five Justices supported the per curiam judgment while four dissented. Three of the five Justices
who supported the decision took the position that the constitutionality of the death penalty
should not be questioned generally; rather, the issue should be limited to the constitutionality
19831 ENMUND v. FLORIDA
the jury to decide arbitrarily whether a guilty defendant will receive the death
penalty or life imprisonment violate the cruel and unusual punishment
clause.3" Because jury discretion in imposing the death penalty was a na-
tionwide practice, the Furman decision required that all existing death penalty
statutes be revised. 3' The Furman opinion did not indicate, however, whether
the death penalty could be held unconstitutional per se.32
Four years later, the Supreme Court attempted to answer the question
of whether the death penalty was intrinsically unconstitutional. In Gregg v.
of the death penalty as it was being applied in the three cases at bar. Justice Stewart believed
that the death penalty was unconstitutional in these cases because it was being imposed wan-
tonly and infrequently; hence, it was unusual punishment. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring). Similarly, Justice White thought that because the death penalty was imposed infrequent-
ly, it could not have much retributive or deterrent effect. Moreover, Justice White could not
discern the difference between cases in which the death sentence was imposed and cases in
which it was not imposed. Id. at 311-13 (White, J., concurring). Justice Douglas also did not
believe that the death penalty should be held unconstitutional per se, but he did find it un-
constitutional as applied. Justice Douglas believed that the death penalty was being applied
discriminately. He argued that complete jury discretion was unconstitutional because a defen-
dant could be sentenced to death based on a jury's whim. Id. at 253, 255-56 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
Both Justices Brennan and Marshall were adamant in their belief that the death penalty is
always cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 285-86 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 359 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring). Justice Brennan observed that
death is an unusually severe and degrading punishment; there is a strong probabil-
ity that it is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by contemporary society is virtually
total; and there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effec-
tively than the less severe punishment of imprisonment. . . . Death, quite simply,
does not comport with human dignity.
Id. at 305.
All four dissenting Justices essentially contended that the legislatures were in a better posi-
tion to evaluate public opinion and determine the extent of imposing the death penalty. See
id. at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 443 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 410 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) id. at 468 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Moreover, there was criticism that the
Furman majority was imposing its moral beliefs on the American people. See id. at 375 (Burger,
CA., dissenting); id. at 467 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
30. This was the problem recognized by the three concurring opinions of Justices Douglas,
Stewart and White. Jury sentencing without standards meant that a jury could impose the death
penalty whenever, and for whatever reason, it saw fit. Jury discretion resulted in capital punish-
ment's infrequent and discriminatory imposition. See id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring); id.
at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
31. See, e.g., Note, Recent Supreme Court Decisions, supra note 1, at 273 (Furman in-
validated more than three-fourths of all state death penalty statutes).
32. Justices Brennan and Marshall believed that the death penalty should be held unconstitu-
tional per se. 408 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 359 (Marshall J., concurring).
It was unclear, however, what conclusion Justices Douglas, Stewart and Blackmun would have
reached if the apparent faults of the death penalty were not remedied. Moreover, if the death
penalty were upheld as constitutional in the future, it was uncertain what procedural safeguards
were required by the separate Furman opinions. See, e.g., id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) (agreeing that discretionary statutes were unconstitutional, but not reaching the issue of
whether mandatory sentencing would be constitutional).
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Georgia,33 the plurality3 ' concluded that the death penalty was not unconstitu-
tional per se when the defendant had taken a life." Although the Court
recognized that the death penalty was an extreme sanction, it found the
punishment suitable for the extreme crime of deliberate murder.3" Noting
the historical acceptance of capital punishment,37 legislative reenactment of
death penalty statutes after Furman," and occasional jury imposition of
33. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In Gregg, it was established that Gregg and his companion Allen
were hitchhiking through Florida when they were picked up by Moore and Simmons. Later,
Moore and Simmons picked up another hitchhiker, Weaver, who traveled with the four men
to Atlanta. The day after Weaver left the other men's company, Moore and Simmons were
found dead. Id. at 158-59. Based on Weaver's information, the police arrested Gregg and Allen.
Id. at 159. Allen testified that Moore and Simmons left the car for a rest, and when they
returned, Gregg shot them and took their money. Id. Although Gregg insisted that the killings
were in self-defense, the jury found him guilty of two counts of murder. Id. The jury con-
sidered three aggravating factors in determining whether to recommend the death penalty: 1)
whether the murders were committed during a felony; 2) whether the purpose of the murders
was pecuniary gain; and 3) whether the murders were outrageously wanton and vile. Id. at
161. Based on the presence of the first two factors, the death penalty was recommended. Id.
34. Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens wrote the plurality opinion in which Justices
Blackmun, Burger, Rehnquist and White concurred. Id. at 153. Consistent with their concur-
ring opinions in Furman, which argued that the death penalty always violates the eighth amend-
ment, Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. Id.
35. Id. at 187. After determining in Gregg that the death penalty was not unconstitutional
per se, the Supreme Court addressed the procedural requirements of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause. The Court upheld bifurcated death penalty statutes in which guilt was first
determined, and in a separate hearing, aggravating and mitigating circumstances were weighed
to determine if capital punishment should be imposed. Id. at 162-68; cf. Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242, 248-51 (1976) (jury sentencing procedure upheld as constitutional because jury
was given guidelines on which to base a decision). Mandatory death penalty statutes, however,
were found unconstitutional. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). Under these statutes, if the jury found the defendant
guilty of a specific crime, capital punishment was imposed automatically. The Court held such
statutory provisions unconstitutional because they allowed jury discretion and failed to take
into account particularized aspects of the defendant or the crime. See Roberts, 428 U.S. at
331-36; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302-03. See generally Tao, The Constitutional Status of Capital
Punishment: An Analysis of Gregg, Jurek, Roberts and Woodson, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L.
345 (1977) (analysis of 1976 Supreme Court cases to determine what questions they answered
and whether the opinions were consistent); Comment, Resurrection of Capital Punishment-
The 1976 Death Penalty Cases, 81 DICK. L. REV. 543 (1977) (discussion of how 1976 cases
answered questions left open by Furman).
36. 428 U.S. at 187. Writing for the plurality, Justice Stewart stated that "when a life
has been taken deliberately by the offender, we cannot say that the punishment is invariably
disproportionate to the crime. It is an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes."
Id.
37. Id. at 176. The Court noted that for nearly two centuries the death penalty has been
held constitutional. Id. at 178; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 377 (1972) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (its framers intended the cruel and unusual punishment clause to ban punish-
ment by torture, not by taking of life); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (throughout
history, the death penalty has been imposed); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)
("Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment
of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution.").
38. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179. The Gregg Court observed that 35 states had reenacted
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capital punishment,39 the plurality concluded that the death penalty was not
contrary to evolving standards of decency."0
In addition to requiring that punishment be acceptable to society, the Gregg
plurality determined that punishment must not be excessive." The Gregg ex-
cessiveness test focused on two factors: first, whether the punishment was
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime; and second, whether
the punishment had some penological justification.42 On the issue of pro-
portionality, the Gregg Court concluded that the death penalty was not a
disproportionate punishment for the crime of deliberate murder. 3 The sec-
ond factor, penological justification, encompassed two possible theories:
retribution and deterrence. Data on death penalty deterrence were in-
conclusive; consequently, the plurality decided that the issue should be defer-
red to legislative judgment." Retribution, however, was held to be a per-
missible objective which was not inconsistent with human dignity. 3 Although
it did not determine whether the death penalty was constitutional for crimes
other than murder, the Gregg decision removed any doubt that death was
a constitutional penalty for deliberate murder.
death penalty statutes after Furman. Id. The plurality concluded that this legislative activity
undercut the argument that the death penalty was no longer accepted by the American people
and, thus, was contrary to evolving "standards of decency." /d.
39. Id. at 181. The Court noted that juries impose death sentences relatively infrequently,
but concluded that this fact does not mean that the death penalty is not accepted; rather,
it merely indicates that juries only impose a severe sentence as a penalty for a severe crime.
Id. at 181-82. The Court buttressed this argument by noting that 714 individuals had been
sentenced to death since Furman was decided. Id.
40. Id. at 181-82. Before reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that courts should play
a limited role in assessing eighth amendment constitutionality. The Gregg Court noted that
when courts assess punishment selected by legislatures, those courts should presume the validity
of the punishment and simply ensure that constitutional bounds have not been overstepped.
Id. at 174-75. Justice Brennan strongly disagreed with this conclusion. id. at 229 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). He believed it was the Supreme Court's duty, as the "ultimate arbiter" of
constitutional meaning, to determine independently whether the death penalty was per se un-
consitutional. Id. Justice Marshall dissented on similar grounds. Id. at 240 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). He articulated his belief that eighth amendment constitutionality cannot be determin-
ed solely on the basis of whether society accepts the challenged punishment. Id.
41. Id. at 173.
42. Id. at 173, 183.
43. Id. at 187. The Court did not elaborate on why, under the circumstances presented
in Gregg, the death penalty was not a disproportionate punishment. It merely stated that deliberate
murder was a severe crime which justified the imposition of a severe penalty. Id.
44. Id. at 184-86. But see Dressier, The Jurisprudence of Death by Another: Accessories
and Capital Punishment, 51 U. CoLo. L. REV. 17, 39 (1979) (the purpose of the eighth amend-
ment is to protect against legislative misconduct, and courts should ensure that this purpose
is fulfilled) [hereinafter cited as Dressier].
45. 428 U.S. at 183. According to the Court, one of the reasons that retribution was a
permissible objective was that it allowed the public to vent its outrage at offensive conduct;
theoretically, if the law did not punish the offender, the public would resort to self-help. Id.
Disagreeing with the plurality's conclusion, Justice Marshall stated that "[tlhe mere fact that
the community demands the murderer's life in return for the evil he has done cannot sustain
the death penalty .. " Id. at 240 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1983]
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The following year, in Coker v. Georgia," the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment when imposed for a crime other than murder. Applying the excessiveness
test formulated in Gregg,4 the Coker Court analyzed whether the death
penalty was a constitutional punishment for the crime of rape. The ex-
cessiveness test provides that the punishment must contribute to society's
accepted penological goals and must be proportionate to the severity of the
crime.4" Examining public attitudes concerning death as a punishment for
rape, the Coker plurality noted that during the preceding fifty years, a ma-
jority of states had not authorized the death penalty as a sanction for rape."
Also, at the time Coker arose, only three states permitted the death penalty
to be imposed for rape, 5" and juries in those states infrequently imposed
the death penalty for that crime.' These factors led the plurality to con-
clude that the death penalty was grossly disproportionate to the crime of
rape. 2 While noting that rape was a terrible crime, second only to murder
in its severity, the Coker Court maintained that rape did not compare with
the irrevocability of taking a human life."
Based on the holdings in Gregg4 and Coker," it is logical to assume that
a death must occur before the death penalty can be imposed. 6 Gregg,
46. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Coker escaped from prison where he was serving time for murder,
rape, kidnapping, and aggravated assault. On the night that he escaped he broke into the Carver
home, tied up Mr. Carver, stole his money, and raped and kidnapped Mrs. Carver. Id. at
587. The jury found Coker guilty, and because there were sufficient aggravating circumstances,
Coker was sentenced to death. Id. at 587-91.
47. Id. at 592. For a discussion of the excessiveness test used in Gregg, see supra notes
41-45 and accompanying text.
48. The Coker Court noted that if the challenged punishment were to fail on either ground,
disproportionality or penological justification, then the punishment would be unconstitutional.
433 U.S. at 592.
49. Id. at 593. In 1925, only 18 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal govern-
ment authorized capital punishment for the rape of an adult woman. In 1971, the number
had declined to 16 states and the federal government. Then, in 1972, Furman v. Georgia
invalidated all state death penalty statutes. In rewriting their death penalty statutes to satisfy
Furman's mandate, only three states chose to make the rape of an adult woman a capital
offense. Id. at 593-94.
50. Id. at 595. Florida, Mississippi and Tennessee authorized the death penalty only in rape
cases in which the rapist was an adult and the victim was a child. Id.
51. Id. at 596-97. Because Georgia was the only state to authorize the death sentence for
the rape of an adult, the jury sentencing study only examined sentences rendered by Georgia
juries. Finding that Georgia juries had sentenced only six rapists to death since 1973, the Court
concluded that juries do not impose death sentences in the vast majority of rape cases. Id.
52. Id. at 598-99.
53. Id. at 597-98.
54. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
56. The Gregg Court held that the death penalty is constitutional when imposed for the
crime of deliberate murder. 428 U.S. at 187. The Coker Court noted that rape was second
[Vol. 32:713
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however, dealt only with an intentional murder, and left unanswered the
question of whether an unintentional killing warrants imposition of the death
penalty.
Intent and the Felony-Murder Doctrine
Whether the punishment is death or a less severe sanction, the purpose
of criminal sanctions is to prevent harm or undesirable conduct." There can
be no crime unless some harm has occurred, or some risk of damage exists."
Furthermore, criminal law also requires that a defendant be found personally
responsible for the harm before liability can be imposed." Personal respon-
sibility or blameworthiness is determined by an examination into the defen-
dant's state of mind; it must be determined whether the defendant intended
to cause the harm resulting from the crime."0
Intent is divided into two categories: specific intent and general intent.
Specific intent is defined as the intent to commit an act with the specific
objective or knowledge that the act will produce a given result.' In con-
trast, general intent involves a deviation from reasonable conduct and the
actor's ability to foresee that such deviation might produce harmful results.
62
Thus, there is an evidentiary distinction between specific and general intent.
only to murder in its severity, yet held that the death penalty was an unconstitutional punish-
ment for rape. 433 U.S. at 597-99. The Coker Court reasoned that rape does not include the
taking of human life; therefore, the crime should not be punished as severely as murder. Id.
at 600. If rape is second in severity only to murder, but cannot be punished by death because
a life has not been taken, logic compels the conclusion that the death penalty can be imposed
constitutionally only in crimes involving a killing. See also Comment, The Constitutionality
of Imposing the Death Penalty for Felony Murder, 15 Hous. L. REV. 356, 356 (1978) (Coker
illustrates the Supreme Court's reluctance to sanction capital punishment for any crime that
is not murder) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Imposing the Death Penalty]; Comment, Capital
Punishment: Death for Murder Only, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 179, 194-96 (1978) (the
Coker plurality would allow the death penalty for murder, but not for any other crime).
57. See, e.g., M. BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2, at 75 (1978) (criminal law
regulates the conduct of individuals); Dressier, supra note 44, at 33 (law tries to prevent harm
or undesired conduct by criminalizing that conduct); Ludwig, Foreseeable Death in Felony Murder,
18 U. PITT. L. REV. 51, 51 (1956) (preservation of life is the purpose of homicide law).
58. Dressier, supra note 44, at 32 (without harm, there is no crime).
59. See, e.g., id. at 33 (criminal law is based on personal blame); Westerfield, The Mens
Rea Requirement of Accomplice Liability In American Criminal Law-Knowledge or Intent?,
51 Miss. L.J. 155, 175-76 (1980) (individual guilt determines liability in criminal law).
60. Dressier, supra note 44, at 33 (generally an individual is not criminally liable unless
he has the requisite mens rea).
61. E.g., M. BAssIouNI, supra note 57, at 178. The law uses various labels, such as "in-
tent" or "knowledge," to denote specific intent. Id. at 177; see also White, Intention, Pur-
pose, Foresight and Desire, 92 LAW. Q. REV. 569, 572 (1976) (intention is the combination
of three elements: purpose, foresight, and desire).
62. See M. BAssIoUNi, supra note 57, at 179. The labels which sometimes are used to denote
general intent include "foreseeability," "recklessness," and "criminal negligence." Id. at 177.
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In specific intent crimes, there must be proof that the actor knew with cer-
tainty that his conduct would produce a certain result.63 General intent crimes,
however, only require proof that it was foreseeable to the actor that his
conduct might produce some undesirable result. 6" Although intent is a dif-
ficult concept to define and to apply,6" the law requires that intent must
be proven for each crime. 6 6 The felony-murder doctrine, however, is an ex-
ception to this proof of intent requirement.
At common law, murder was defined as the unlawful killing of a person
with express or implied malice. 67 If a life was taken unintentionally during
the course of a felony, the felony-murder doctrine was used to supply the
requisite malice needed to charge the felon with murder. 68 Under this doc-
trine, the intent to commit the underlying felony was transferred to the
homicide. By transferring intent, the malice requirement to prove murder
was satisfied. 69
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. E.g., Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 107, 137 (to ar-
ticulate or apply the concept of mens rea is a formidable task); see also M. BASSIOUNI, supra
note 57, at 169 (intent is difficult to determine because the subjective state of mind must be
determined by objective factors). Throughout this Note, the terms intent, mens rea, mental
element, and culpability will be used interchangeably.
66. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 57, at 168; see also Packer, supra note 65, at 109 ("to punish
conduct without reference to the actor's state of mind is both inefficacious and unjust").
67. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 195 (T. Cooley 3d ed.
1884); see also 0. HOLMES, THE COMM6N LAW 51 (1909) (murder is "unlawful homicide with
malice aforethought"); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 34 (2d ed. 1969) (murder is "homicide
committed with malice aforethought").
68. Lord Coke is credited with creating the felony-murder concept. E.g., 2 WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL LAW § 145, at 204 (C. Torcia 14th ed. 1979) (attributing responsibility for the felony-
murder doctrine to Lord Coke); Note, A Survey of Felony Murder, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 453, 453
(1955) (felony-murder doctrine was postulated initially by Coke) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Survey]. Coke's exact words were, "[i]f the act be unlawful, it is murder." 3 E. COKE, IN-
STITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 56 (1628 & photo. reprint 1979). Contra M. BASSIOUNI,
supra note 57, at 247 (felony-murder theory has existed since 1256, and appears in Bracton's
De Legibus et Consuetinibus Anglias). For a sample of cases illustrating the felony-murder
doctrine, see People v. Caldwell, 102 Cal. App. 3d 461, 478, 162 Cal. Rptr. 397, 407 (1980)
(accidental killing during robbery will trigger the felony-murder rule); People v. Ross, 92 Cal.
App. 3d 391, 402, 154 Cal. Rptr. 783, 788 (1979) (first-degree murder encompasses any inten-
tional or nonintentional killing committed in the perpetration of a robbery or burglary); State
v. Battick, 133 Vt. 558, 561, 349 A.2d 221, 223 (1975) (elements of first-degree murder are
supplied by the felony-murder doctrine); Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 762, 284
S.E.2d 811, 814 (1981) (under the felony-murder doctrine, malice needed for murder is sup-
plied by the malice related to the felony).
69. See R. PERKINS, supra note 67, at 45; see also De Loach v. State, 388 So. 2d 31,
32 (Fla. 1980) (homicide plus intent to commit a felony supply the malice aforethought needed
for first-degree murder); People v. Burke, 85 111. App. 3d 939, 941, 407 N.E.2d 728, 730 (1st
Dist. 1980) (whether the victim is killed intentionally, accidentally, or by another is immaterial
under the felony-murder doctrine); People v. Till, 80 Mich. App. 16, 29, 263 N.W.2d 586,
592-93 (1977) (intent to commit a felony is equivalent to malice aforethought); 2 WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 68, § 145, at 204 (law transfers malice of the felony to the homicide);
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The felony-murder rule also applied to co-felons who did not directly cause
the death; if two or more people agreed to commit a felony and a death
occurred during its commission, then all co-felons were responsible for the
death.7" The rationale underlying this application was that all the participants
should be responsible for the acts of their co-participants, because the kill-
ing would not have occurred but for the underlying agreement to commit
the felony.7 This doctrine had little impact at common law, however, because
the punishment for both murder and any other felony was death.72
Today, the felony-murder doctrine retains vitality in most jurisdictions.73
Yet, its application has been restricted to felonies which are inherently
dangerous or are enumerated by statute."' Despite this limited application,
many courts and commentators have criticized the doctrine's utility and
Comment, Constitutional Limitations upon the Use of Statutory Criminal Presumptions and
the Felony Murder Rule, 46 Miss. L.J. 1021, 1022 (1975) (the felony-murder theory employs
a leghl fiction: one who commits a felony has the intent to commit murder) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Constitutional Limitations].
70. See People v. Medina, 41 Cal. App. 3d 438, 452, 116 Cal. Rptr. 133, 143 (1974) (under
the felony-murder theory, an accomplice is guilty, just as the actual killer, of any homicide
that occurs during the felony); Mumford v. State, 19 Md. App. 640, 6.43, 313 A.2d 563, 566
(1974) (even if an unintentional killing occurs during a felony, every person who engaged in
the felony is responsible for murder); Alexander v. State, 250 So. 2d 629, 631 (Miss. 1971)
(the defendant and others conspired to commit a robbery in which a co-Felon killed the victim;
because of the felony-murder doctrine, the defendant was guilty of murder); State v. Boggs,
634 S.W.2d 447, 454 (Mo. 1982) (to hold a defendant responsible for a killing by a co-felon,
there is no need to prove that the defendant knew that the co-felon was practically certain
to commit murder); see also D. JONES, CRIME AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 132 (1978) (each
co-felon is responsible for a death caused by the act of one of them); 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
LAW, supra note 68, § 145, at 208 (even if the co-felon is not'the actual killer, he is responsible
for the death).
71. Crum, Casual Relationships and the Felony Murder Rule, 1952 WASH. U.L.Q. 191,
192-93; see also People v. Muszalski, 260 Cal. App. 2d 611, 619, 67 Cal. Rptr. 378, 382-83
(1968) (the felony-murder doctrine's purpose of deterring killing is achieved by holding co-
felons strictly responsible for all killings they commit during one of the enumerated felonies),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1059 (1969); State v. Williams, 254 So. 2d 548, 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1971) (the felony-murder doctrine's purpose is to prevent death of innocent persons).
72. E.g., M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 57, at 247; see also Ludwig, supra note 57, at 52 (at
common law, doctrine made no difference because all felonies were punishable by death); Com-
ment, Imposing the Death Penalty, supra note 56, at 364 (there was no legal significance of
the felony-murder doctrine at common law because all felonies were capital crimes).
73. Two states, however, have abolished the doctrine as a basis for liability. See HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 707-701 & comment at 347 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 507.020 (Supp. 1978). Addi-
tionally, the British Parliament abolished use of the felony-murder rule in 1957. See Homicide
Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 11, § I.
74. E.g., M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 57, at 249; see also Ex parte Ritter, 375 So. 2d 270,
273-74 (Ala. 1979) (an accomplice's liability for a murder during a felony stems from the ac-
complice's participation in an inherently dangerous act), vacated sub nora., Ritter v. Alabama
448 U.S. 903 (1980); Comment, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 69, at 1035 (when the
underlying felony is deemed by the legislature to create a substantial certainty of causing a
life-threatening situation, then intent needed for murder is presumed).
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fairness. 5 The doctrine has been challenged as violating established prin-
ciples of criminal law which require punishment to relate to individual in-
tent and culpability."6 It has been argued that it is unfair to hold a co-felon
responsible for a murder that was an unintended and unlikely consequence
of the underlying felony."
Prior to its decision in Enmund, the Supreme Court had failed to address
the felony-murder doctrine's inequitable premise of transferred intent. Never-
theless, in Lockett v. Ohio," several Justices discussed the possible require-
ment of proof of criminal intent. The evidence in that case showed that
Sandra Lockett and three others planned the robbery of a pawnshop. Dur-
ing the course of the robbery, the pawnbroker was killed accidentally. At
trial, Lockett's participation in the robbery as the getaway driver was held
sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder.79 Furthermore, the trial court
found that two aggravating factors existed which warranted imposition of
the death penalty." Although it was clear that Lockett neither intended nor
foresaw the killings, she was sentenced to death.8'
Although the Supreme Court vacated Lockett's death sentence on pro-
75. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 583 n.6, 414 P.2d 353, 360 n.6, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 232 n.6 (1966) (the felony-murder doctrine artificially imposes malice); Dressier,
supra note 44, at 57 (the felony-murder theory is inconsistent with fundamental criminal law
because an accomplice can be convicted of murder with a lesser mens rea than is required
for conviction of the perpetrator); Moreland, Kentucky Homicide Law with Recommendations,
51 Ky. L.J. 59, 82 (1976) (modern reasons do not exist for the rationale underlying the felony-
murder doctrine). There are two schools of thought on reforming the doctrine. One suggests
replacing the automatic transfer of intent with a rebuttable presumption of intent; the other
calls for abolishing the doctrine completely. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962) (rebuttable presumption); Ludwig, supra note 57, at 61-64 (the test should
be one of probability); Packer, The Case for Revision of the Penal Code, 13 STAN. L. REV.
252, 259 (1961) ("Itlhe rule is unnecessary in almost all cases in which it is applied"); Note,
Criminal Law-The Felony Murder Doctrine Repudiated, 36 Ky. L.J. 106, 109 (1947) (ap-
propriate punishment can be imposed without use of the felony-murder doctrine) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Repudiated].
76. See Fletcher, Reflections on Felony Murder, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 413, 418 (1981) (it is
surprising that neither legislatures nor courts have brought the felony-murder doctrine within
well-accepted boundaries of criminal law theory); Hall, Theory and Reform of Criminal Law,
29 HASTINGS L.J. 893, 907 (1978) (the felony-murder rule is contrary to concept of mens rea);
Hogan, Crime, Punishment and Responsibility, 24 VILL. L. REV. 690, 693 (1979) (felony-murder
is anomalous to a system requiring focus on the defendant's intentions).
77. See Note, Repudiated, supra note 75, at 108-09 (1947).
78. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
79. Id. at 589-91. At trial, Lockett's counsel argued that Lockett knew nothing about the
robbery plans. Instead, he asserted that Lockett believed that her codefendants simply were
going to the pawnshop to pawn a ring. Id. at 592.
80. Id. at 589. The first aggravating factor was that the murder was committed for the
purpose of escaping punishment. The second was that the murder was committed during an
armed robbery. Id. These factors are two of seven which render aggravated murder punishable
by death in Ohio. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03-.04 (Page 1975).
81. 438 U.S. at 594. Unable to find the existence of any mitigating factors, the sentencing
judge concluded that, whether he approved of the law or not, he had no alternative but to
sentence Lockett to death. Id.
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cedural grounds,8 2 several Justices discussed the possible requirement of proof
of specific intent. 3 Justice White took the position that without proof of
specific, individual intent to kill, the death penalty was an unconstitutional
punishment.8" Disagreeing, Justice Blackmun stated that eighth amendment
constitutionality should not be determined solely on the basis of lack of
intent.85 Under this view, lack of intent could be incorporated into the eighth
amendment requirements as a mitigating factor." Moreover, Justice Blackmun
disagreed that only specific intent to kill could satisfy the eighth amend-
ment; lesser degrees of intent, such as intent to commit great bodily harm
or recklessness, would be sufficient. 7 Four years after Lockett, in Enmund
v. Florida, the full Court explicitly considered whether the death penalty
was a constitutional punishment for a co-felon who neither killed, nor in-
tended that a killing occur.
THE ENMUND DECISION
The Facts of Enmund v. Florida
On April 1, 1975, Thomas and Eunice Kersey were robbed and killed at
their Florida farmhouse." Earl Enmund and Sampson Armstrong were tried
as codefendants and, subsequently, convicted of the Kersey robbery and
murder. 9 The evidence at trial established that on the morning of April 1,
Sampson and Jeanette Armstrong9" approached the Kersey farm on the
pretense of obtaining water for an overheated radiator. When Mr. Kersey
went to get the water, Sampson grabbed him and told Jeanette to retrieve
his wallet. Responding to her husband's cry for help, Mrs. Kersey came from
the house carrying a gun and shot Jeanette. Gunfire was exchanged and
both Thomas and Eunice Kersey were killed. Sampson, and perhaps
Jeanette, 9' took the money and dragged the bodies into the farmhouse.
Thereafter, they fled to the getaway car where Earl Enmund was waiting
to drive them away.92
82. The Lockett Court held that at sentencing a judge must consider, as a mitigating fac-
tor, any evidence of character or circumstance that the defendant offers as a reason for impos-
ing a sentence less severe than death. Id. at 604-05. Because the Ohio death penalty statute
did not permit individualized consideration of mitigating factors, Lockett's death sentence was
reversed. Id. at 606-09.
83. For a discussion of the specific intent principle, see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
84. 438 U.S. at 624 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
85. Id. at 614-15 n.2 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
86. Id. at 615-16.
87. Id. at 614-15 n.2.
88. 102 S. Ct. at 3370.
89. Id.
90. Jeanette Armstrong was tried separately. She was found guilty of two counts of second-
degree murder and one count of robbery, and was sentenced to three consecutive life sentences.
Id. at 3370 n.l.
91. The Florida trial court reasoned that because Jeanette's gunshot wounds were so serious,
in all probability, she was incapacitated immediately. See id. at 3381 n.12 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
92. Id. at 3370.
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At trial, the jury found Earl Enmund guilty of first-degree murder and
robbery,93 and recommended that the death sentence be imposed.94 During
the sentencing proceeding, the trial judge found the existence of four ag-
gravating factors: the murders were committed during the course of a felony,"
the murders were committed for monetary gain,96 the murders were par-
ticularly "heinous, atrocious, [and] cruel," 97 and the defendant previously
had been convicted of a felony.9" These factors, coupled with the absence
of any mitigating factors, led the judge to sentence Enmund to death. 9
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Enmund's death
sentence.' °° Although it observed that the evidence did not support the trial
court's presumption that Enmund had participated in the murders,'"' the
state supreme court found that his participation in planning the robbery'0 2
93. Sampson Armstrong also was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and
one count of robbery, and the jury recommended the death penalty. Id.
94. Id. Under Florida law, the jury advises the judge on whether the death penalty should
be imposed. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (Supp. 1981). Capital punishment trials are
bifurcated proceedings in Florida. In the first hearing, the defendant's guilt is determined. If
a guilty verdict is rendered, the second hearing consists of an examination of aggravating and
mitigating factors in an effort to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed. See
id. § 921.141(1).
95. 102 S. Ct. at 3370; see also FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(d) (Supp. 1981).
96. 102 S. Ct. at 3370; see also FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(f) (Supp. 1981).
97. 102 S. Ct. at 3370; see also FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(h) (Supp. 1981).
98. 102 S. Ct. at 3370; see also FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(b) (Supp. 1981).
99. 102 S. Ct. at 3371.
100. Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1373 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam).
101. Id. at 1370. In the sentencing order, the trial judge stated that Enmund had been pre-
sent and had aided in the murders. Id. at 1373. The state supreme court, however, held that
because there was no direct evidence to support this statement, the inference was impermissi-
ble. Id. at 1370. The appellate court upheld Enmund's conviction, though, because the jury
could have inferred that Enmund was the getaway driver; this inference was sufficient to sup-
port the murder verdict on the basis of felony murder. Id.
The Florida Supreme Court's findings concerning Enmund's presence at, and aid in, the
murders could have been the basis for a remand for resentencing. This was the view of Justice
Overton, who concurred in upholding the conviction, but believed that a resentencing hearing
was necessitated by the state supreme court's findings. Id. at 1373 (Overton, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
These findings also led the dissenters in the United States Supreme Court to conclude that
a new sentencing hearing was required. 102 S. Ct. at 3392-94 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The
dissent contended that the trial court's misunderstanding of the facts violated the Woodson
mandate, requiring a court's consideration of individual circumstances before imposing a sentence.
Id. at 3394. Furthermore, the dissent was concerned that the impermissible finding had af-
fected the trial judge's decision. Id.
102. The Florida Supreme Court did not expressly discuss Enmund's involvement in plan-
ning the robbery. The majority of the United States Supreme Court, however, concluded that
the Florida court had negated this trial court finding when it noted that the only permissible
inference regarding Enmund's participation was that he was the getaway driver. 102 S. Ct.
at 3371 & n.2. Yet, the dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion. Id. at 3391. The Florida
Supreme Court had upheld the trial court's finding that there were no mitigating circumstances.
399 So. 2d at 1373. It was determined that the one possible mitigating factor, minor involve-
ment, was not applicable to Enmund because his role had been major-Enmund had planned
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and driving the getaway car was sufficient to hold him responsible for the
acts of his co-felons under the felony-murder doctrine. °3 Rejecting Enmund's
argument that the death sentence was cruel and unusual punishment when
imposed upon a co-felon who neither killed nor intended to kill, the Florida
Supreme Court noted that transferred guilt in felony murders had a long
history of acceptance.' 4 Even though the state supreme court found that
only two of the four aggravating factors identified by the trial court were
present, it concluded that those factors were sufficient to affirm Enmund's
death sentence. 105
On July 2, 1982, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida
Supreme Court's decision.' 06 The Court held that the death penalty was
disproportionate and unconstitutional when imposed upon an aider and abet-
tor to a felony murder unless there was a showing that the co-felon took
life, intended that life be taken, or contemplated the taking of life.'" 7
The Supreme Court Opinion
The majority's'08 analysis began with a reiteration of the well-established
principle that the eighth amendment protects against excessive punishments.
The Court stated that the excessiveness test, formulated in Gregg' 9 and
Coker,"o would be used to determine whether Enmund's punishment by death
was excessive in relation to his crime. The first prong of the excessiveness
test, disproportionality, required a consideration of the expressions of
legislative judgment and jury response. The Court examined the thirty-five
state statutes"' which authorized the death penalty as indications of legislative
judgment. The Enmund majority found that only nine states" 2 permitted
and participated in the robbery. Id. Additionally, Enmund's counsel conceded at sentencing
that Enmund had initiated the robbery. Enmund, 102 S. Ct. at 3381 n.10, 3301 n.40.
103. Enmund, 399 So. 2d at 1369-70.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1373. The trial court found four aggravating factors: the murders were commit-
ted in the course of a felony (armed robbery), the felony was committed for monetary gain,
the murders were heinous, and Enmund had a previous felony conviction. Id. at 1371-72. The
Florida Supreme Court considered the first two factors as a single aggravating circumstance
because the circumstances of robbery and monetary gain consisted of one factor. Id. at 1373.
The aggravating factor that the murders were heinous was rejected because there was no proof
that the Kerseys had been killed to eliminate them as witnesses. Id. Finally, Enmund's prior
felony conviction was upheld as an aggravating circumstance. Id.
106. 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3379.
107. Id. at 3376-77.
108. Justice White wrote the majority opinion in which Justice Brennan, writing separately,
concurred. Id. at 3368. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined Justice
O'Connor's dissent. Id.
109. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
111. 102 S. Ct. at 3372-74.
112. The nine states were California, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Nevada, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Washington and Wyoming. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 189, 190.2(a)(17) (West Supp.
1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.082(1), 782.04(l)(a), 921.141(5)(d) (West 1976 & Supp. 1982);
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the death penalty to be imposed for a nontriggerman's participation in a
robbery in which a murder was committed." 3 The Court noted that this
legislative study was not as conclusive as the one conducted in Coker;"4
nevertheless, it concluded that the study weighed against imposing death in
Enmund's case. The other objective indicator, jury opinion, showed that
in the last twenty-five years, only six out of the 362 individuals executed in
the United States were nontriggermen in a felony murder. ' 5 According to
the Enmund majority, Florida's sentence of death, imposed on a nontrig-
german co-felon, was disproportionate when compared to sentences imposed
in other jurisdictions.' 6
The second prong of the excessiveness test, penological justification, re-
quired the Court to determine the values of deterrence and retribution for
a nontriggerman in a felony murder. The Enmund majority concluded that
the death penalty could not possibly deter felons who did not contemplate
the taking of life." 7 The majority reasoned that deterrence might be a valid
factor if the likelihood of killing during a felony was substantial, but statistics
proved that the chance was slight. '" In addition, retribution would not be
achieved by executing Enmund because the value of retribution depended
on culpability, and the Court did not consider Enmund to be personally
culpable of the murders. The majority maintained that punishment under
the eighth amendment must be tailored to personal responsibility and moral
guilt; the death penalty was not tailored to suit a co-felon who neither killed
nor intended a death to occur. ' 9
After determining that the death penalty for Enmund's crime was
disproportionate and without penological justification, the majority stressed
that while the judgment of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors is important,
the Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of whether the eighth amendment
permits imposition of the death penalty. 2 ° The Enmund Court concluded
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101(b)(c), 27-2534.1(b)(2) (Supp. 1980); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-19(2)(e),
99-19-101(5)(d) (Supp. 1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.030(l)(b) to -.033(4) (1981); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-3-10, -3-20(C)(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(a),
-203(i)(7) (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.32.030(l)(c)(1), -. 32.040(1) (1977 & Supp. 1982);
Wvo. STAT. §§ 6-2-101, -2-102(h)(iv) (Supp. 1981).
113. 102 S. Ct. at 3372.
114. Id. at 3374. In Coker, the Court found that four states allowed the death penalty as
punishment for rape; in three of these states, to impose the death penalty, the victim had
to have been a child. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
115. 102 S. Ct. at 3375-76. Additionally, the Court noted that at the time the Enmund opin-
ion was written, only 40 of the 739 individuals on death row had not actually participated
in the murders for which they were sentenced. Id.
116. Id. at 3376.
117. Id. at 3377-78.
118. The statistics relied upon by the Enmund majority were collected by the American Law
Institute and demonstrated that only one-half of one percent of all robberies resulted in homicide.
Id. at 3378 & n.23. Out of the 548,809 robberies that occurred in the United States in 1980,
death resulted in approximately 2,361 instances. Id. at 3378 n.24.
119. Id. at 3378.
120. Id. at 3376-76.
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that although robbery is a serious crime, it is not serious enough to warrant
imposition of the death penalty. 2 ' Emphasizing that the focus must be on
individual culpability, the majority found that it was impermissible to punish
Enmund in the same manner as his co-felon killers.' 22 The Court announced
that Enmund's death sentence violated the eighth amendment's bar against
cruel and unusual punishment because Enmund did not have the requisite
intent, and the culpability of his co-felon could not constitutionally be
transferred to him.' 23
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
The Inconclusive Excessiveness Test
Applying the excessiveness test formulated in Gregg,'24 the Supreme Court
determined that sentencing Enmund to death for a murder committed by
his co-felon constituted cruel and unusual punishment. In analyzing dispropor-
tionality, the first element of the excessiveness test, the Enmund Court ex-
amined state statutes and jury verdicts. Theoretically, if these indicia
demonstrate that society disfavors the particular punishment for the crime
in question, then the punishment is excessive and unconstitutional.'25 In con-
sidering these criteria, the Enmund Court drew tenuous conclusions regard-
ing societal opinion. These conclusions were considerably weaker than the
Court implied.
After examining state statutes that authorize the death penalty, the En-
mund majority concluded that only nine states would impose the death
penalty on a nontriggerman for his participation in a robbery during which
a victim was killed.' 26 Although the Court conceded that another nine states
might permit the imposition of a death sentence based on vicarious liability,
it observed that in six of these nine states minor participation is a mitigating
factor,'27 and in the remaining three states felony murder is not considered
121. Id. at 3377.
122. Id. The Court stated that "Itihe question before us is not the disproportionality of
death as a penalty for murder, but rather the validity of capital punishment for Enmund's
own conduct. The focus must be on his culpability, not on that of those who committed the
robbery and shot the victims ... " Id. (emphasis in original).
123. Individual culpability is given special treatment only in capital punishment cases; therefore,
Enmund's mandate that co-felon culpability cannot be transferred only applies to death penalty
cases. Id. (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)).
124. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
125. Some commentators have criticized the objective tests used by the Court as being unac-
ceptable for evaluating legislative judgments. See, e.g., Dressier, supra note 44, at 41 (the ob-
jective tools are unacceptable and the Court should use its own judgment).
126. 102 S. Ct. at 3372-74; see supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
127. See Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(3) (1978) (minor participation may be con-
sidered as a mitigating circumstance); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46(a) (West 1960) (same);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(4) (Burns 1979) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(6) (1981)
(court may consider "any evidence . . . deemled] to have probative force"); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-2523(2)(e) (1979) (minor participation may be considered as a mitigating circumstance);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(4) (1978) (same).
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an aggravating factor. '28 Because consideration of such factors is required
before imposition of capital punishment, the Court concluded that these nine
states would not impose the death penalty on a co-felon in factual cir-
cumstances similar to those presented in Enmund. The Court, however, er-
red in reaching this conclusion.
The Enmund majority implied that six states would not sentence Enmund
to death because those states consider minor participation in a felony to
be a mitigating factor. This implication presents two problems. The first
problem is that these states do not define minor participation.' Thus, it
is difficult to determine whether these six states would characterize Enmund's
participation as "minor." It is clear, however, that these states-do not
automatically characterize as a "minor participant," a co-felon who was not
the triggerman in a felony murder.' 3 °
The second problem with the Court's analysis is its failure to explain how
the mitigating factor of minor participation was relevant to the decision to
impose capital punishment on Enmund. Both the trial court and the Florida
Supreme Court found that Enmund's participation in the felony was
"major.""' Therefore, because the mitigating factor of minor participation
128. See IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(f) (1979) (felony murder is not enumerated as an aggravating
factor); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12 (West 1981) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 23A-27A-l (1979) (same).
129. Minor participation was not defined in any of the state statutes, and its definition was
not apparent from case law. It appears that the question of whether an accomplice's participa-
tion was relatively minor is determined solely by judicial discretion based on the facts of the
particular case. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 118 Ariz. 263, 270, 576 P.2d 122, 129 (1978) (an
accomplice's participation was held to be relatively minor because all he did was help dispose
of the victim's body).
130. See, e.g., State v. Collins, Ill Ariz. 303, 307, 528 P.2d 829, 833 (1974) (a defendant
can be punished for first-degree murder and robbery even if that defendant did not actually
shoot the victim); Brewer v. State, __ Ind. __ , 417 N.E.2d 889, 904 (1981) (a death sentence
may be imposed constitutionally upon one who is an accessory to murder), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 3510 (1982); see also State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 633 P.2d 335 (1981). In that case,
the defendant and his two brothers helped their father and another convict escape from prison.
While the five men were fleeing from the police, four people were murdered. The defendant
argued that he did not deserve the death sentence because the murders had been committed
by the convicts and his own participation was minor. Disagreeing with this proposition, the
court held that the mere fact that the defendant did not shoot the victim did not mean that
his participation was minor. Id. at 545, 633 P.2d at 354. Furthermore, the Tison court noted
that even if it considered the defendant's participation to be minimal, this mitigating factor
would have been outweighed by the existence of two aggravating factors: 1) murder for monetary
gain; and 2) the defendant's previous felony conviction. Id. at 542-44, 633 P.2d at 351-54.
Tison substantially weakens the Enmund Court's rationale. Even assuming that Enmund's
participation was minor, Enmund was found to possess the same aggravating factors present
in Tison. See supra note 105. According to the Tison court, these aggravating factors outweighed
the single mitigating factor of minor participation and, consequently, the death penalty was
an appropriate punishment. 129 Ariz. at 555-56, 633 P.2d at 364-65; see also Lewis v. State,
380 So. 2d 970, 977 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979) (existence of mitigating factors does not automatically
mean no death sentence; such factors must be weighed against aggravating factors).
131. 399 So. 2d 1362, 1373 (Fla. 1981) ("The evidence clearly indicates that the defendant
was an accomplice to the capital felony and that his participation in the capital felony was
major.").
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does not apply to Enmund's conduct, the Court's reliance on this factor
was misplaced.
Additionally, the Court reasoned that three of the states which allowed
imposition of the death penalty based on vicarious liability would not sentence
Enmund to death because those states' statutes do not list felony murder
as an aggravating circumstance. This reasoning is subject to criticism,
however, because all three states define first-degree murder as any killing
which occurs during the perpetration of an enumerated felony.' 32 Thus, felony
murder in those states is not an aggravating factor; rather, it is a form of
first-degree murder. Accordingly, imposition of the death penalty on En-
mund would not be foreclosed in those states because one aggravating fac-
tor existed, and there were no mitigating factors to outweigh it.'"
Furthermore, three states which the Court concluded required a showing
of intent before subjecting a nontriggerman to capital punishment only re-
quire proof of a minimal level of intent. These states do not require proof
of intent to kill, but merely proof of recklessness or grave risk of death.' 3
Arguably, this lower requirement of intent was present in the planned rob-
bery of the Kersey farm,' 33 making imposition of the death penalty on En-
mund a possibility in these three states. Hence, a non-killer co-felon may
receive a death sentence absent evidence that he either took life, or intended
that life be taken, in twenty-one of the thirty-five states which provide for
132. See IDAHO CODE § 18-4003(d) (1979) (arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, or
mayhem); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7(b) (West Supp. 1982) (arson, rape, robbery, burglary,
kidnapping, or escape); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-16-4 (1979) (arson, rape, robbery,
burglary, kidnapping, or unlawful use of explosives); see also Tilford v. Page, 307 F. Supp.
781 (D. Okla. 1969) (each participant in felony murder is guilty of murder arising during the
felony whether or not the felon actually committed the killing), vacated in part on other grounds,
408 U.S. 939 (1972); Lewis v. State, 451 P.2d 399, 400 (Okla. 1967) (defendant was merely
a getaway driver who did not participate in the assault and beating; yet, as a principal under
the felony-murder rule, the defendant was guilty of murder).
133. See supra note 95-105 and accompanying text.
134. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1501(I)(a) (1977) (death resulting during commission of a
felony because of extreme indifference to life is considered capital murder); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. II, § 636(a)(2) (1979) (recklessly caused death occuring during a felony is first-degree murder);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020(1)(b) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1978) (a person is guilty of murder
if he either causes death because of extreme indifference to human life, or creates a grave
risk of death); see also Stewart v. State, 257 Ark. 753, 761, 519 S.W.2d 733, 738, cert. denied,
423 U.S. 859 (1975) (all participants in robbery are equally guilty of murder).
135. For example, Delaware statutes provide that "[a) person acts recklessly . . . when he
is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the element
exists or will result from his conduct." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 231(c) (1979). It may be
argued that Enmund's conduct was reckless because, when he supplied his co-felons with loaded
guns, he knew that there was a risk that they might use them. See also M. BASSIOUNI, supra
note 57, at 169 (if an individual acts voluntarily, the assumption is that the person intends
the natural and probable consequences of his conduct); cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). The Model Code states that criminal homicide constitutes murder
when "it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life. Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged
or is an accomplice in ... robbery, rape .... arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape."
Id.
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capital punishment.' 36 It thus appears that the Enmund majority misconstrued
state statutes and drew tenuous conclusions about those statutes to support
its decision.
The Court's further reliance on jury sentencing in felony-murder cases does
not substantiate its conclusion that, in such instances, the death penalty con-
travenes societal standards. The Enmund Court's conclusion, that society
disfavored the death penalty, was based on a survey which indicated that
out of the 362 individuals executed since 1954, only six were nontriggermen;
moreover, of the 739 people then on death row, only forty did not par-
ticipate in a killing. 3 7 Although these statistics are impressive, they are not
conclusive of jury response. 3 ' Because there is no indication of how often
states unsuccessfully seek the death penalty for an accomplice to felony
murder, the percentage of juries that reject capital punishment in such cases
cannot be determined. Furthermore, there is no indication of the number
of accomplices who could have been tried and convicted for murder, but
were not so tried because they agreed to testify against the triggermen.'
The statistics also might mean that juries only impose the death penalty on
accomplices when serious implication in the homicide is clear. " Accord-
ingly, the statistics proffered by the Court do not necessarily indicate that
juries disfavor death as a punishment for co-felons who do not intend a
killing to occur.
In scrutinizing the second criterion of the excessiveness test, penological
justification, the Enmund Court utilized the traditional guidelines of deter-
136. These 21 states include the nine states that the Court conceded would sentence Enmund
to death. See supra note 112. Additionally, there are nine other states that allow vicarious
liability and whose aggravating and mitigating factors would not effect Enmund's death sentence.
See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text. Finally, there are three more states which re-
quire a very minimal level of intent, a level which arguably was present in Enmund's cir-
cumstances. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. The Enmund dissenters characterized
the states' positions differently. They concluded that 24 states would impose the death penalty
on Enmund even though he neither actually committed the killings nor intended them to occur.
102 S. Ct. at 3390 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 3375-76.
138. One commentator has criticized the analysis of jury verdicts as being speculative; he
argued that it is unclear whether jury decisions are rendered because the penalty is too severe
for the crime, or simply because the evidence is insufficient. Dressier, supra note 44, at 40-41;
see also Y. KAMISAR, HOW TO USE, ABUSE,-AND FIGHT BACK WITH-CRIME STATISTICS, reprinted
in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, RESOLVED: THAT U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
SHOULD BE GIVEN SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER FREEDOM IN THE INVESTIGATION AND/OR PROSECU-
TION OF FELONY CRIMES, H.R. DOC. No. 230, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 128 (1977) (statistics can
be manipulated to prove almost any point) [hereinafter cited as Y. KAMISAR].
139. See, e.g., Comment, Imposing The Death Penalty, supra note 56, at 376 ("prosecution
saves its strongest felony-murder cases for jury trial by refusing to plea bargain them").
140. This was argued in the Enmund dissent. 102 S. Ct. at 3388 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
The dissent also contended that jury sentencing was not a conclusive rejection of capital punish-
ment because of jury response to mandatory sentencing. Id. at 3387 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing). Moreover, the Eninund dissent concluded that no matter what these statistics showed,
they did not prove that juries only impose the death penalty when it has been proven that
the defendant possessed an intent to kill. Id. at 3388 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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rence and retribution; if the punishment promotes neither deterrence nor
retribution, it will be held unconstitutionally excessive.' 4 Prior to Enmund,
the Supreme Court declared that retribution was an acceptable reason for
imposing the death penalty.' 42 The Enmund majority, however, limited the
applicability of retribution to cases in which specific individual culpability
is proven." 3 Noting that culpability is based on individual intent to cause
a specific result,' the Court concluded that retribution is an acceptable
reason for imposing the death sentence only in cases involving such culpability.
The severity of the death penalty renders this a just conclusion. Moreover,
because the Court did not extinguish nontriggerman co-felon liability,' 4 5
society can continue to punish such offenders. The Enmund decision only
mandates that the killing cannot be punished by death unless the defendant
killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a death occur.
Only six years before deciding Enmund, the Court stated that it was uncer-
tain whether the death penalty deters crime; thus, the issue of deterrence
was left to state legislatures to decide.' 46 The Enmund majority retracted
this position and concluded that deterrence was useless unless' the defendant
intended the crime.' 4' Based on available statistics,' 48 the Court reasoned
that the likelihood of killing during a robbery was so slight that the threat
of the death penalty would not deter the criminal from committing the rob-
bery. Even assuming this reasoning is substantiated, the focus should be on
the factors of the specific robbery, rather than on an examination of rob-
beries in general. For instance, if a robber carries a loaded gun into a store,
the likelihood of a death resulting would be greater than if the robber car-
ries an unloaded gun, or no gun at all. ' 9 Additionally, the cornerstone con-
141. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
142. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
143. 102 S. Ct. at 3378.
144. Id.
145. A few cases decided since Enmund have recognized that the Enmund holding only ap-
plies to capital punishment situations. See, e.g., Godbolt v. State, 429 So. 2d 1131 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1982) (Enmund held inapplicable because the appellant was faced with a life sentence;
Enmund applies only to death penalty cases), cert. denied, No. 82-579 (Ala. Sup. Ct. Apr.
29, 1983); People v. Dotson, 137 Cal. App. 3d 288, 186 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1982) (Enmund does
not affect the proportionality of a life sentence for felony murder).
146. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184-86 (1976).
147. 102 S. Ct. at 3377.
148. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
149. One commentator surveying general crime statistics made these observations:
Guns play an increasingly deadly role in aggravated assault and robbery .... One
of every three robberies . . . is committed with a gun .... There is no hard evidence
to prove or disprove the thesis that lacking a gun, an enraged person will resort
to a knife or other weapons. But there is evidence demonstrating that the fatality
rate of firearm attacks is more than four times greater than the fatality rate for
knife attacks (knives being the next most frequent and lethal weapon used in
homicides). Thus, even if the number of violent attacks did not go down, the number
of fatalities resulting from violent attacks would be substantially reduced if the
attackers did not have guns.
Y. KAMISAR, supra note 138, at 136.
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cept of the felony-murder doctrine is that some felonies are inherently so
dangerous to human life that, for purposes of deterrence, punishment for
participation in these felonies should be severe. 5 Hence, based on a single
statistical study, the Enmund Court undercut the rationale for the felony-
murder doctrine.
On the basis of tenuous conclusions regarding legislative statutes, jury
sentencing, and retribution and deterrence, the Enmund Court held that the
death penalty is an excessive punishment for a co-felon who neither took
a life nor intended that a life be taken. Therefore, under such circumstances,
the Court found that capital punishment violates the eighth amendment.
Clearly, the evidence was not as conclusive as the majority suggested, and
based on traditional standards, a contrary decision might have been reached.
The Enmund majority, however, buttressed its position by requiring a new
eighth amendment standard: proof of specific intent to kill.
The New Standard of Intent
Although contrary to felony-murder precepts, the Enmund Court's require-
ment of proof of individual, specific intent to kill is consistent with basic
criminal law theory.'' Moreover, by requiring proof of intent, the Enmund
decision addresses criticism that the felony-murder doctrine is inequitable
because of its failure to concentrate on individual intent and culpability.'
52
Despite the merits of imposing an intent requirement, the Enmund decision
is problematic because the Court did not'clearly articulate a requisite level
of intent.
Intent is a nebulous concept which has been difficult to apply in several
criminal areas.'" It has been viewed as perhaps the most complex issue in
criminal law.' 4 In addition, courts and legislatures have been criticized for
their inability to define and apply the concept of intent." The inherent prob-
lems in defining the notion of intent, however, do not justify a rejection
of the Court's position that a finding of intent is requisite to imposing the
150. See, e.g., D. JONES, supra note 70, at 131 (the felony-murder doctrine encompasses
deaths which are the natural and probable result of the felony, or the result of an inherently
dangerous felony); Note, Survey, supra note 68, at 455 (the felony-murder doctrine is restricted
to felonies which produce risk of death or great bodily harm, or crimes committed with dangerous
force and reckless disregard for human life).
151. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text. Even though this new requirement of
intent is consistent with criminal law theory, the Court never explained exactly why prosecutors
in capital felony-murder cases suddenly are required to prove intent. One commentator's obser-
vations may serve as a possible explanation: "[T]he Supreme Court regards mens rea as con-
stitutionally unimportant except when it serves as a convenient peg on which to hang a result
that it thinks desirable but is unwilling or unable to defend on other grounds." Packer, supra
note 65, at 127.
152. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
154. See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 57, at 169.
155. See Packer, supra note 65, at 137.
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death penalty on a nontriggerman in a felony murder. Indeed, proof of in-
tent, despite being difficult to apply and define, is required in most areas
of criminal law.' 56 Nevertheless, the problems of intent will be compounded
in capital felony-murder cases because the Enmund Court failed to articulate
the requisite level of intent which must be proven before a nontriggerman
can be sentenced to death.
Although the Court did not specify the necessary level of intent, by stating
that the death penalty is unconstitutional if the defendant did not kill, at-
tempt to kill, or intend that a killing occur, the Enmund majority seemed
to require a finding of specific intent.'57 Moreover, based on the Model Penal
Code ("Model Code") definitions of intent, it appears that the Enmund
Court was imposing a higher level of intent than mere general intent.' 58 Ap-
plication of the Model Code'59 to Enmund is justified because the Supreme
Court itself has employed the Model Code definitions in other criminal
cases. ' The Model Code lists four levels of intent or culpability: purposeful,
knowing, reckless, and negligent.' 6 ' In analyzing Enmund under these levels
of intent, it appears that Enmund possessed one of the lower levels of reckless
156. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
157. 102 S. Ct. at 3376-77. The following additional language also seems to mandate proof
of specific intent: "We are quite unconvinced, however, that the threat that the death penalty
will be imposed for murder will measurably deter one who does not kill and has no intention
or purpose that life will be taken." Id. at 3377. The words intent and purpose are usually
used to refer to specific intent. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
158. Another fact which seems to indication that Enmund requires proof of specific intent
is the fact that Justice White, who wrote the Enmund majority opinion, previously took the
position that the eighth amendment requires a finding of specific intent before the death penalty
can be imposed constitutionally. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 624-25 (1978) (White, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part).
159. The Supreme Court did not mention the Model Penal Code in the Enmund opinion.
Nevertheless, the Court is familiar with the Model Code's definitions of culpability, and an
examination of these definitions demonstrates that the Court was applying a high level of intent.
160. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403-09 (1980) (examination of the Model
Penal Code and doctrine of mens rea); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
422, 438 (1978) (Supreme Court approved of § 2.05 of the Model Penal Code); see also Erlinder,
Mens Rea, Due Process, and the Supreme Court: Toward a Constitutional Doctrine of Substantive
Criminal Law, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 163 (1981). Erlinder argues, through an examination of case
law, that the Model Penal Code definitions of mens rea have been accepted by the Supreme
Court, and that the Model Code provides a basis for a constitutional doctrine of mens rea.
Id. at 175-91.
161. The Model Code provides:
(I) Minimum requirements of culpability. Except as provided in Section 2.05, a
person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly
or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of
the offense.
(2) Kinds of culpability defined.
(a) Purposely. A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an
offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence
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or negligent intent.' 62 Because Enmund's conduct would have satisfied only
the Model Code's two lower levels of intent, it is arguable that by refusing
to apply the death penalty, the Enmund Court was demanding that one of
the higher levels of intent be present.' 3
Despite its apparent mandate that proof of a higher level of intent exist
before a nontriggerman in a felony murder can be sentenced to death, the
Enmund opinion contains no explicit statement concerning the appropriate
level of intent. There are two plausible reasons for the Court's failure to
make such a statement. First, it is possible that the Justices were not in
complete accord on the level of intent required by the eighth amendment
to impose the death penalty on a nontriggerman. This position is illustrated
by contrasting the opinions of Justices White and Blackmun.'" In Lockett
v. Ohio,'65 Justice White declared that the Constitution should be interpreted
as requiring proof of a conscious purpose to kill before the death penalty
can be imposed.' 66 In contrast, Justice Blackmun argued in a concurring
opinion that intent should play a more limited role in imposing capital punish-
ment. Justice Blackmun disagreed that proof of specific intent to kill should
be required and suggested that lesser standards of intent would be sufficient. 67
of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
(b) Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an
offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances,
he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically
certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
(c) Recklessly. A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such
a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's con-
duct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the ac-
tor's situation.
(d) Negligently. A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of
an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the
nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves
a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe
in the actor's situation.
Model Penal Code § 2.02(1)-.02(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
162. See supra note 161. Enmund's conduct could be considered reckless because he knew
his co-felons were carrying guns, and he ignored the substantial and unjustifiable risk that
someone possibly could be hurt or killed.
163. See id. The definitions of purposely or knowingly require that the defendant either con-
sciously desire a result, or that the defendant know that such a result will be produced by
his conduct. Applying these definitions to Enmund's conduct, Enmund either had to desire
the Kerseys' deaths or know with certainty that the Kerseys would die.
164. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
165. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
166. Id. at 624-25, 628 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
167. Id. at 614-15 n.2 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun believed that proving
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A second explanation for the Court's failure to articulate the constitutionally
mandated level of intent could be the federal judiciary's fear of intruding
into the traditional right of states to define crimes and their corresponding
elements. "8
Regardless of the reason for the Court's failure to articulate the level of
intent that must be proven before a nontriggerman in a felony murder can
receive the death penalty, that failure presents a problem for lower courts
which must interpret Enmund. Presumably, the underlying aim of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Enmund v. Florida was the abolition of the
individual intent to kill would be too difficult a task. It is interesting to note that one of
the hypotheticals posed by Justice Blackmun to illustrate his point concerned a robbery ac-
complice who sits in the getaway car knowing that his co-felon is brandishing a loaded gun,
a fact pattern similar to that in Enmund. Justice Blackmun wondered how the state would
prove intent for the getaway driver even if the accomplices had agreed to use the gun if necessary.
Id.
168. Customarily, state legislatures determine what constitutes a crime. It may be argued
that the Court intruded into an area of state discretion by requiring proof of intent in capital
felony-murder cases. See, e.g., Comment, The Eighth Amendment: Judicial Self-Restraint and
Legislative Power, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 434, 439-40 (1982). This was one of the reasons that
the dissent disagreed with the Enmund majority. "The Court's holding today is especially dis-
turbing because it makes intent a matter of federal constitutional law. . " 102 S. Ct. at
3391 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent's position may be viewed as an argument that
the Supreme Court should interpret the Constitution according to the intent of the Framers.
See generally Berger, The Role of the Supreme Court, 3 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 11
(1980) (constitutional interpretations differing from the Framers' intent should be allowed only
by amendment to Constitution). Judicial activism in criminal matters also has been criticized
as weakening the states' tenth amendment right to define and administer criminal law. See
R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES 28 (1982).
Yet, this criticism may be challenged on several grounds. First, it is the prevailing belief
among commentators that the intent of the Framers should not be the sole guide to constitu-
tional interpretation. See, e.g., Miller, The Elusive Search for Values in Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 496-500 (1979) (framers' intent is an inadequate
framework for constitutional interpretation); Lusky, "Government by Judiciary": What Price
Legitimacy? (Book Review), 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403, 403-10 (1979) (history is only one
factor in the examination of legitimate judicial review). These commentators argue that the
Constitution is not a static document, but rather a viable, living document that must be inter-
preted in light of changes in society. See, e.g., Miller, supra, at 508. If the Constitution was
unable to respond to evolving social values, it would have been discarded long ago. Id. Moreover,
these commentators recognize that society has come to accept and expect an active judiciary.
See, e.g., Kutler, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment: A History or Ahistorical?, 6 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 511, 524-25 (arguing that legislatures often are unresponsive to societal needs,
and that courts can force examination of issues that society otherwise might ignore).
Second, even assuming the Supreme Court should take a passive role in interpreting the Con-
stitution, requiring proof of specific intent before the death penalty can be imposed in the
felony-murder situation is a limited exception to this position. The felony-murder doctrine is
a unique fictitious device. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text. It should not be
employed as a justification for capital punishment, even if it requires activism by the Supreme
Court. States still retain the right to define first-degree murder as a murder occurring during
the commission of a felony. Enmund simply mandates that once a defendant is found guilty
of the crime as defined by state statute, specific intent must be proven before the death penalty
may be imposed. This approach attempts to insure that the death penalty will be imposed
only upon the most culpable and morally aberrant individuals.
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felony-murder doctrine as a basis for imposing the death penalty. Enmund
does not affect the ability of states to require intent when convicting a defen-
dant of first-degree murder. Rather, the Enmund holding addresses only the
use of the felony-murder concept as a basis for imposing capital punish-
ment after the elements of the underlying crime have been proven. As a
result of Enmund, if a state seeks the death penalty for a nontriggerman
in a felony murder, the state must prove that he intended to cause a death.
States no longer can rely on the presumed intent inherent in the felony-murder
doctrine.
Although it is clear that the Enmund majority was not satisfied with a
low level of intent, '69 the Court's failure to explicitly require a higher level
of intent will allow lower courts to undermine the thrust of the Enmund
decision.' 70 To insure that courts follow the Enmund approach, the Supreme
Court should have stated explicitly that specific intent must be proven before
a nontriggerman in a felony murder can receive the death penalty. Addi..
tionally, because specific intent is itself a nebulous concept, the Court also
should have articulated a definition of specific intent. For example, the Court
could have defined the requisite specific intent as deliberate or willful, terms
commonly used in first-degree murder statutes, 7 ' or as knowing and pur-
poseful, terms used to define specific intent under the Model Code.'
If the Supreme Court had implemented this approach, lower courts would
have less difficulty understanding the requirements of Enmund. They would
be unable to circumvent the result sought by the Enmund Court by requir-
ing proof of lesser degrees of intent. Furthermore, by defining intent in a
manner similar to that found in first-degree murder statutes or the Model
Code, the Supreme Court would have provided guidance for the lower courts
in understanding the required level of intent; ample precedent applying these
definitions of intent already exists.
Future Implications
The Enmund Court failed to articulate the level of intent that must be
proven before a nontriggerman in a felony murder can be sentenced to death.
As a result, the constitutional protection provided by the Enmund decision
may be limited. Implicitly, Enmund requires proof of specific intent; yet,
because the Court failed to articulate this, lower courts have no specific
guidelines to apply in future felony-murder cases. Thus, it is possible for
lower courts to comply facially with the Enmund requisite of intent, yet
circumvent the goal of Enmund by requiring proof of a lesser degree of
169. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
170. The Enmund dissent recognized that intent would be difficult to prove and that, in
all likelihood, the Supreme Court ultimately would be forced to develop an eighth amendment
definition of intent. 102 S. Ct. at 3391 (O'Connor J., dissenting).
171. See M. BASSlOUNI, supra note 57, at 243-44.
172. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
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intent. This possibility is illustrated in two cases decided subsequent to
Enmund.
In Hall v. State,'73 Hall and his co-felon sat in a grocery store parking
lot, waiting to steal a car for use in a robbery. When the victim, Mrs. Hurst,
came out of the grocery store, Hall grabbed her and forced her into her
car. Hall testified that he directed Mrs. Hurst to a nearby wooded area where
his co-felon sexually assaulted and shot her. Hall was convicted of first-
degree murder and sentenced to death.'" On appeal, the Florida Supreme
Court held that even though Hall did not actually pull the trigger, the fact
that he was present at the site of the victim's death was sufficient to hold
him responsible for the murder and to uphold his death sentence.'"
Although this appeal was decided prior to Enmund, the possible applica-
tion of Enmund was discussed in the Florida Supreme Court's denial of
Hall's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.' 6 The Court distinguished En-
mund on the bases that Hall had provided the weapon and was present at
the victim's death.' Furthermore, Enmund was aiding and abetting only
the robbery, while Hall was aiding and abetting not only the underlying
felony, but also the murder itself. 78 Relying on these factors, the Hall court
declared that it was convinced that Hall intended the death to occur, and
therefore it denied the writ.'"
The state supreme court did not indicate what level of intent Hall possessed.
It seems certain, however, that in applying Enmund, the Hall court focused
on general, rather than specific, intent. Arguably, Hall possessed general
intent because the plan to kidnap Mrs. Hurst and steal her car was a devia-
tion from normal, reasonable conduct and was likely to result in harm to
the victim.' 8 ° Although Hall may have intended to abandon the victim in
the woods and use her car to proceed with the, robbery as planned, it is
not clear that he intended the death of the victim. Under a specific intent
173. 403 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 420 So. 2d 872
(Fla. 1982) (per curiam).
174. 403 So. 2d at 1322-25.
175. Id. at 1321.
176. Hall v. State, 420 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1982) (per curiam).
177. Id. at 874.
178. Id.; see also State v. Tiller, 94 Ill. 2d 303, 447 N.E.2d 174 (1982). Both the majority
and the dissent in Tiller disagreed as to the meaning of Enmnund. The majority held that the
defendant could not be sentenced to death on the authority of Enmund because there was
no evidence that the defendant had planned or participated in the murders. Id. at 324, 447
N.E.2d at 185. Yet, Justice Moran strongly disagreed with the Tiller majority's interpretation
of Enmund. He believed that there was evidence that the defendant in Tiller had planned the
robbery, and, unlike Enmund, the defendant was present during the robbery for some time.
Justice Moran believed that the Tiller opinion would make it very difficult to sentence anyone
to death. Id. at 324-26, 447 N.E.2d at 185-86 (Moran, J., dissenting).
179. 420 So. 2d at 874.
180. General intent has been defined as the foreseeability of likely harm resulting from the
actor's deviation from reasonable, standard conduct. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying
text.
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standard, the death penalty could not have been imposed on Hall because
there was no proof that he specifically intended the killing to occur. '8
Subsequently, in Womack v. State,8 2 an Alabama appellate court upheld
a state statute that allows the death penalty to be imposed against a non-
triggerman accomplice upon proof of culpable mental state.' 83 Although the
court found that the Alabama law is consistent with the Enmund re-
quirements, in fact, the law does not appear to require proof of specific
intent. The words proof of a culpable mental state merely imply that proof
of either type of intent, general or specific, is required. Thus, the Alabama
statute is seemingly at odds with Enmund's implicit mandate of proof of
specific intent.' 84
The Womack court further found that the Enmund rationale did not ex-
tend to the Alabama case because under Alabama law, an accomplice to
a felony may be guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death if the
accomplice aided and abetted an intentional killing by the triggerman.'8 5 The
court defined aiding and abetting as "assistance rendered through acts or
words of encouragement or support or presence, actual or constructive, to
render assistance should it become necessary."' 88 This definitional approach
is known as the accomplice-liability doctrine, and the Womack court's opin-
ion appears to suggest that Enmund's proof of intent requirement applies
only to the felony-murder doctrine, and not to the accomplice-liability
doctrine.' 87 Assuming that Sampson Armstrong intentionally killed the
Kerseys, and assuming further that Enmund's conduct complied with
Alabama's definition of aiding and abetting, under the Womack approach
Enmund could have received the death penalty without proof that he
specifically intended the killings.' 88 This result boldly contravenes Enmund's
holding that before a nontriggerman can receive the death penalty, there
must be proof that he killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing
occur.
Because the Supreme Court failed to articulate the level of intent required
in certain common circumstances, such as those presented in Hall and
Womack, lower courts have discretion to determine what level of intent is
necessary before imposing the death penalty on a nontriggerman. As pre-
viously demonstrated, a lower court can camouflage its determination of in-
tent by simply stating that intent was present; the court does not have to
181. Specific intent requires proof that the actor intended his conduct to produce a certain
result. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
182. 435 So. 2d 754 (Ala. Crim. App.), aff'd sub nora. Ex parte Womack, 435 So. 2d 766
(Ala. 1983).
183. 435 So. 2d at 762.
184. For a discussion of the distinctions between the levels of intent, see supra notes 61-66
and accompanying text.
185. 435 So. 2d at 762-63.
186. Id. at 763.
187. Id. at 762-63.
188. Id.
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explain what ievel of intent existed or how the intent was proved. In order
to resolve this problem, the Supreme Court once again will have to con-
front the meaning of intent for eighth amendment purposes.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding that Earl Enmund did not deserve to die
because he did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill, seems fair and
just when applied to the Court's interpretation of the facts presented in En-
mund. In order to reach that conclusion, however, the Court stretched the
limits of the excessiveness test and formulated a new, unclear requirement
of proof of intent.
The Court manipulated the objective factors of the excessiveness test to
prove that death is an excessive punishment for one who does not intend
to kill. The standards for both cruel and unusual punishment, and the ex-
cessiveness test, are the results of the Supreme Court's historic struggle
to define cruel and unusual punishment. The Eninund opinion brings into
question the continued validity, as well as the objectivity, of these standards.
If the Enmund holding had been based on the excessiveness test alone, the
decision might have been different because the examination of societal opin-
ion and penological justification was not conclusive. The decision, however,
rested equally on the application of the new capital punishment requirement
of proof of individual intent to kill.
Nevertheless, it remains possible to base liability on either transferred in-
tent of a co-felon, or transferred intent from the underlying felony, as long
as that liability does not result in the punishment of death. Furthermore,
because the Court failed to indicate the requisite level of intent, this new
eighth amendment requirement might not curtail imposition of the death
penalty immediately. The Supreme Court should have stated that specific
intent must be proven before a nontriggerman in a felony murder can receive
capital punishment. Because the Court failed to articulate this, lower courts
can undermine the thrust of Enmund by requiring proof of less than specific
intent. As a result, a future Court will be compelled to confront the issues
which Enmund should have resolved.
Laura L. Kerton
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